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IAC-D-81/13
25 November 1955

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Copy No. 44

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile

Intelligence Survey Committee

References: IAC-D-81/12 (Final), 19 July 1955
IAC-M-204, 19 July 1955, Item 3

1. Attached is the report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee.

2. This report has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 6 December 1955.

[redacted]
Acting Secretary

Attachment:

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FINAL REPORT

AD HOC GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE SURVEY COMMITTEE

4 November 1955

(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA) (Agreed) (State, AEC, CIA)

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee was organized in accordance with IAC-D-81/12, dated 19 July 1955. Committee members were nominated by each member agency of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, (IAC) with exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which stated it desired no regular representation. The National Security Agency (NSA) also nominated a member upon invitation extended by the IAC.

The mission of the Ad Hoc Committee, as stated in IAC-D-81/12.

"will be to survey and evaluate the efforts of the U. S. intelligence community in the field of guided missile intelligence, to include the coverage, emphasis, guidance and status of coordination now existent in this field, and submit a comprehensive report on the state of guided missile intelligence in the U. S., and in friendly foreign powers, together with recommendations as to IAC action."

In carrying out this mission general inquiry was made into the present status of guided missile intelligence, into the operations of guided missile intelligence-producing agencies, into functioning of information-collecting agencies, into the functioning of coordinating groups and committees, and into the necessity for increased emphasis on operations in these areas. Each area was reviewed with regard to coverage, emphasis, guidance and status of coordination.

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To acquaint the Committee with the community effort in the guided missile field, briefings were given by representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, CIA, NSA, FBI, State Department, and IAC Committees concerned. In addition, CIA representatives presented [redacted] Each department, agency and IAC Committee was asked to brief the Survey Committee regarding its activities in the field of guided missiles with specific consideration of the following seven areas, as appropriate:

a. Requirements
b. Guidance to collectors
[redacted]
d. Utilization of community assets
e. Lateral flow of intelligence information
f. Intelligence research and analysis
g. Intelligence production

In conducting the survey, the Committee was guided by the following Intelligence Directives as they relate to the duties and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies concerned:

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 15
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 17
Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 3/4
Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5
Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 15/1

Based on the findings, conclusions were drawn by the Committee and are herein presented. Recommendations based upon these conclusions are also submitted.

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II. CONCLUSIONS

1. The critical requirements of the community for guided missile intelligence are not at present being satisfied, primarily because of the inadequacy of information available.

2. The present collection efforts are inadequate to fulfill stated requirements for intelligence information.

[redacted]

4. Certain new technical methods for collection have produced a significant amount of the currently available direct information. This new information is of considerable value and further exploitation of these technical methods holds great promise.

5. *A lack of understanding and/or of effective working relationships continues to exist between collectors and consumers, with consequent impairment of both collection and production activities.

*NSA and Joint Staff abstain.

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6. *A duplication of effort between the Department of Defense and the CIA exists in the field of operational characteristics of guided missiles, which is contrary to the provisions of NSCID No. 1, NSCID No. 3, and DCID No. 3/4.		6. Guided missile intelligence is critically important to national security, and in accordance with NSCID No. 3, responsibility for this intelligence, in its entirety, must be shared by the entire intelligence community.
7. The present organizational structure is adequate to coordinate the community guided missile intelligence effort.		7. The present organizational structure is not adequate for efficient and effective coordination and guidance of the community guided missile intelligence effort; this deficiency can most simply be rectified by establishment of a joint mechanism with essentially the missions and functions delineated in Tab A.
8. There are deficiencies in the coordination of intelligence activities which can be rectified by increasing the competence and breadth of participation in the existing coordination mechanisms.		

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*Air Force abstains.
**Endorsed by Army, Joint Staff, NSA, AEC, and CIA.
***Endorsed by the State Department, Navy, and Air Force representatives, with this explanatory note: Although the term "correlating" is interpreted to include identification, it is the opinion of the State Department, Navy, and Air Force representatives that, in order to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation, the word "identifying" should also be used to clearly define the area encompassed in the basic problem of how best to identify pertinent to guided missile intelligence.

(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)	(Agreed)	(State, AEC, CIA)

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. *The CIA direct its guided missile intelligence analysis efforts to the field of basic science as provided by NSCID No. 1, NSCID No. 3, and DCID No. 3/4.

[redacted]

3. Each agency of the intelligence community examine its guided missile intelligence program to determine that it, within the allocation of resources available, reflects the priority accorded this field by:

a. Assignment of adequate numbers of competent personnel to collection, analysis, and coordination activities.

1. Intelligence on guided missiles, being of critical importance to national security, be allocated as the production responsibility of all interested agencies, and that those portions of DCID 3/4 in conflict therewith be rescinded.

2. The IAC form a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC), with responsibility to the IAC for essentially the missions and functions delineated in Tab A.

3. The GMIC be directed to devote a major part of its initial effort to actions designed to improve guidance to the collection effort and to the flow of collected information.

4. Each agency of the intelligence community, under guidance of GMIC, examine its guided missile intelligence program in the light of its responsibilities and, within the allocation of resources available, to determine that it reflects the priority accorded this field by:

a. Assignment of adequate numbers of competent personnel to collection, analysis, and coordination activities.

*Air Force abstains.

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(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

(Agreed)

(State, AEC, CIA)

[redacted]

c. Increased emphasis on the development and implementation of more effective techniques for collection of guided missile intelligence.

[redacted]

b. Provision of adequate logistic support to guided missile field collection activities.

c. Increased emphasis on the development and implementation of more effective techniques for the collection of guided missile intelligence.

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*Joint Staff abstains.
**Endorsed by Army, Joint Staff, NSA, AEC, and CIA.
***Endorsed by State Department, Navy, and Air Force representatives.

(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

(Agreed)

(State, AEC, CIA)

IV. DISCUSSION

A discussion on this subject not considered appropriate.

A. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

NIE 11-12-55, a Supplement to NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field", is currently under preparation and will contain the details concerning our state of knowledge relative to the status of the Soviet guided missile program.

[redacted]

B. REQUIREMENTS

It was brought out before the Committee that each intelligence consumer formulates requirements for intelligence on foreign guided missile activities

Each consumer reported that general and specific requirements on this subject had been prepared which, if fulfilled, would meet his needs. Time did not allow

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which are responsive to his specific need. Each consumer reported that he had a formal list of general and specific requirements on this subject which gave sufficiently wide coverage to meet his needs. Due to the divergent missions of the respective consumers, their needs for intelligence differ widely. For example, while the CIA requires intelligence on basic science related to guided missiles, the military consumers require detailed intelligence on weapons design, performance characteristics and operational employment.

Each agency has developed within the limitations of its resources, assets to fulfill its guided missile intelligence requirements. The stated guided missile intelligence requirements of the agencies of the intelligence community are not being fully satisfied at this time.

examination of these requirements in detail to ascertain the completeness of coverage. Questioning of the representatives of the activities under survey by the Committee, however, elicited the fact that only in the most general sense was each activity knowledgeable of the requirements of the others. This was considered significant in that the needs of the individual activities varied widely, due to their primary missions and responsibilities, and considerable overlap of needs was indicated. Within the limitations of its resources and guided by individual interpretation as to its role in the overall scheme of activities, each activity is developing unilaterally assets to fulfill its guided missile intelligence requirements. Even so, requirements for guided missile intelligence are not being satisfied at this time.

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C. GUIDANCE TO COLLECTORS

1. General

Each intelligence production organization determines its own requirements for intelligence information as needed to support its individual intelligence requirements and serves them on its own collectors as well as on the other intelligence community collection agencies.

The collection effort, to be strong, virile and effective, must be guided to a significant degree by statements of requirements by the consumers. The complexity and scope of the U. S. intelligence effort complicates the establishment of effective guidance in the guided missile field as it was brought out to the Committee that there were at least seventeen (17) activities, with fairly well defined functions, now collecting, evaluating, collating or producing guided missile intelligence. Inasmuch as each intelligence

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production organization, having determined its own needs, serves its requirements on its own collectors as well as on other intelligence collection agencies, a better defined coordinative process is required to keep from confusing the collectors.

It was brought out that the formulator of requirements is not always fully able to express requirements to collectors since he does not have an adequate understanding of the collectors' capabilities and limitations. Communications between the analyst and the collector have often been less than required to produce an effective understanding of mutual problems, intelligence objectives, detailed requirements for information, priorities, etc.

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Where it is possible to formulate joint requirements, such formulation has been performed and coordinated by several existing organizations, such as:

The Guided Missile Working Group (GMWG) of the Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS);

the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC);

the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC);

the Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC); and

ad hoc IAC NIE post mortem committees.

It was brought out that there have been a few cases where joint requirements have been formulated. Increased activity in this area would measurably increase the effectiveness of guidance to the collector. Practically all of the joint guidance is contained in the following examples. In 1953, JIC 603/15, entitled "Technical and Scientific Intelligence Collection" with an enclosure on "High Priority Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives", was issued. A first draft of this paper was formulated by joint efforts of CIA and the USAF, and under direction and guidance of the Guided Missile Working Group (GMWG) of JTIS/JCS. Copies of the finished paper were forwarded to CIA and State Department. There was no follow-up made by JTIS as to whether or not action was taken on this paper by the

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The coverage of the individual and joint requirements, although not complete, has improved as the emphasis on the collection of guided missile intelligence relating to [redacted] has increased.

With but few exceptions, the coordination of joint requirements is satisfactory.

[redacted]

As the situation now exists, it is considered that the formulation of joint requirements is unsatisfactory.

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2. Overt Collection

It was brought out before the Committee that each collection organization provides general and specific guidance to its own collectors. In addition, each specific request for information contains guidance to the collectors. The Armed Forces provide joint guidance to their own and outside agency collectors through the mechanism of the GMWG of JTIS. An example of the coordinated guidance so provided is contained in JIC 603/15, a paper on "Technical and Scientific Intelligence Collection" with an enclosure on "High Priority Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives." A copy of this paper was forwarded to CIA and the State Department. Coordinated community guidance for collectors is effected through several mechanisms which include the SEC, EIC, USCIB, and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC).

It was stated to the Committee that each organization possessing assets in the collection field provides general and specific guidance to its own collectors. Furthermore, it was stated that individual agencies exercise the prerogative of placing some of their requirements on the collection activities of other agencies. Also, as illustrated above, there have been a few cases where joint requirements have been placed on collectors.

The fact as to whether the sum total of individual plus joint requirements, as currently served on the collectors, completely cover all needs of the community for intelligence information, in a clear and unmistakable manner, was not proved to the satisfaction of the Minority. An examination into the specifics of the community's needs and guidance based thereon to collectors is indicated as one of the first orders of business of a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee.

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There was criticism, expressed by the CIA to the effect that no single overall body is providing the control and direction from which might be obtained better utilization of collection resources. The organizational structure and authority delegated by law to the governmental agencies of the U. S. intelligence community precludes the subordination of individual agency intelligence responsibilities to the control and direction of a supervisory committee. Further, the responsibilities assigned to the U. S. Armed Forces prohibits the military commander from the dissipation of his Service intelligence assets through action of a committee which cannot share those responsibilities. Therefore, overall coordination is effected on an informal and advisory basis.

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D. COLLECTION EFFORTS

1. General

[redacted]

(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA) (Agreed) (State, AEC, CIA)

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[redacted]

Existing guided missile committees and panels are believed potentially capable of fulfilling the requirements for intra-community coordination on guided missile collection matters. Over-coordination can well result in the dilution of collection projects designed for specific purposes.

[redacted]

Existing guided missile coordinating committees and groups are not believed potentially capable of fulfilling the requirements for intra-community coordination on guided missile collection matters unless the charter of one such group was amended to give it essentially the functions and missions as delineated in Tab A.

[redacted]

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

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

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

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

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E. UTILIZATION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS

Briefings presented to the Committee revealed that the allocation of intelligence assets to the field of guided missiles by the Air Force, NSA, and CIA reflects the priority accorded guided missiles. However, in comparison with the programs of the Air Force, NSA, and CIA, those of the Army and Navy are quite small and appear to be inadequate in the areas of evaluation and analysis.

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The collection services of each agency have been shown to be responsive to requirements levied by the other members of the intelligence community, and existing committees such as the JTIS, SEC, EIC, IPC represent focal points for coordination of the various facets of intra-agency collection requirements.

The GMWG of JTIS serves as the mechanism for the informal coordination of guided missile intelligence within the intelligence community. Although organized within the JCS structure, the group supports the entire community through associate membership on the part of civilian agencies. At present CIA and NSA are so represented.

In addition, the GMWG serves as the coordinating group in the preparation of scientific and technical estimates and studies in the guided missile field, under the guidance of JTIS. Although these estimates and studies are of a military nature, intended for use of the Department of Defense, the views of the civilian agencies are considered during the preparation of the paper.

The collection services of each agency have demonstrated more or less satisfactorily their responsiveness to requirements levied by the other members of the intelligence community. The responsibility for inter-agency coordination of these requirements is currently split between four groups; viz., JTIS (GMWG), SEC, EIC, and IPC, as follows:

The GMWG of JTIS is the only permanent inter-service group whose responsibilities and functions lie wholly within the guided missile field. This is comprised of one member each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Membership from other IAC activities is not permitted under JCS regulations, and representatives from these activities attend GMWG meetings as observers only. It was stated to the Committee that this group had functioned satisfactorily in the past, and could continue in the future to furnish all necessary coordination and guidance required between all consumers and most all collectors. The minority Committee opinion, however, is that this group has very rarely attempted needed jobs of coordination, but rather meets only as an informal group, with no fixed agenda, to discuss new evidence and what the evidence may mean. Even in this group, important

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Should the occasion arise wherein a military estimate or study is to be used in the preparation of a National Estimate and the civilian agency view has not been considered to the satisfaction of such agency, recourse to have such view fully considered is available through the mechanism of the SEC. All scientific and technical estimates or studies intended for national use are reviewed by that Committee.

DCID 3/4 designates the Scientific Estimates Committee as a permanent inter-departmental Committee to integrate scientific and technical intelligence for the production of national intelligence and to stimulate and guide inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate. The SEC has the specific authority to designate "such additional persons as may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or report on a particular subject under consideration by the committee," and has actually designated such persons on ad hoc basis to deal with the subject of guided missile intelligence.

The EIC recently established a guided missile working group, on a trial basis, for the purpose of drawing up requirements and developing intelligence relative to the various economic implications of the guided missile problem.

*The Committee believes there exists some duplication of effort among members of the community. An example of this is the CIA, where substantial resources appear to have been diverted from their primary responsibility in the field of basic science, and applied to the CIA Guided Missiles Division.

*Air Force abstains.

material [redacted] has not been fully discussed. It should also be noted that by charter this group is limited to the scientific and technical field, and no responsibility is assigned nor implied for consideration or action in the economic or or operational areas of missiles.

The SEC, formed by the IAC under DCID 3/4, operates under a rather narrow charter. This committee is charged with integrating departmental scientific and technical intelligence for the production of national intelligence and with stimulating and guiding inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate. This committee handles production of guided missile scientific and technical intelligence as a part of its overall responsibility. The SEC has the specific authority to designate "such additional persons as may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or report on a particular subject under consideration by the committee", and has on two occasions designated ad hoc groups to deal with the integration and production of guided missile national estimates.

The Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) was formed by Directive IAC-D-22/1, 29 May 1951, with responsibility to the IAC for coordination and guidance in collection and production of intelligence in the economic area. On the basis of this responsibility, the EIC formed an ad hoc Guided Missile Working Group in the Spring of 1955. This group did some preliminary constructive work in the economic area. Although its charter expired after a six-month period, the group is still functioning on a trial basis.

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The responsibilities assigned to this Division include the operational aspects of guided missile intelligence which is a duplication of the assigned responsibilities of the Department of Defense.





Although some refinement in techniques and shift in emphasis is desirable, the utilization of existing community guided missile intelligence assets appears generally satisfactory and in consonance with the policies set forth in DCID 3/4.

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F. LATERAL FLOW

The complex organizational structure of all agencies of the intelligence community plus the restrictions imposed by security considerations represent the basic constraint to the complete and rapid lateral flow of guided missile intelligence and intelligence information. Although procedures exist in the various services and agencies for the sanitization of sensitive information prior to general dissemination, there are unavoidable delays inherent in such procedures. The resultant product at times loses some value through the sanitization process, although procedures are designed and intended to keep such loss to a minimum.



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Established coordinating agencies (JTIS, SEC, EIC, JAEIC, etc.) guide the lateral flow of guided missile intelligence and intelligence information and serve to expedite the processing and release of undisseminated information whenever the availability of such information becomes known to the group.



G. INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The Committee recognizes the fact that little direct information is available, therefore, greater emphasis must be placed on the research and analysis of low grade or secondary information. The AF, NSA, and CIA have recognized this need and increased their analytical staff. The Army and Navy have adopted very limited measures to increase exploitation of this secondary source.

This analysis phase of intelligence production appears to be satisfactorily coordinated and directed within each agency. Desirable informal coordination between analysts takes place as a continuous operational process on a community-wide basis.

Present coordination between agencies is not of such quality or completeness that the community can be assured either that there is not undesirable duplication or that all avenues of approach are being exploited. Other than through informal liaison and coordination, which, as primary means of guidance, are considered

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(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)	(Agreed)	(State, AEC, CIA)
The SEC and the Guided Missile Working Group of JTIS are focal points for coordination of research and analysis efforts within the community, and where current and proposed research projects can be discussed and mutual aid received. Through this mechanism unnecessary duplication of effort may be eliminated. Full utilization of these existing committees has not been completely realized by the community.		unsatisfactory where so many agencies are involved, only the SEC and the EIC act to inform the community as to activity in this field. The SEC publishes for the community an Annual Report of the Status of Scientific and Technical Production Projects. The EIC publishes an Annual Report of Internal and External Economic Research Projects on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Neither Committee, however, makes any assessment as to duplication in the community's overall guided missile program.

H. PRODUCTION

The Committee is of the opinion that production of guided missile intelligence by the community is commensurate with the information available.		The production of guided missile intelligence is below the minimum requirements of the community. For the most part, this has resulted from insufficient collection of information.
It must be noted that individual agency production is usually designed to meet the requirements of that agency only. Guidance and coordination are in such instances effected within the agency concerned. However, through wide dissemination of reports and publications the agency view is transmitted to the entire community.		It should be noted that much of an individual agency's production is designed to meet the requirements of that agency only. Guidance and coordination are in such instances effected within the agency concerned. The degree of dissemination of this production to the community for its information was not established.
In the production of national estimates and studies, guidance and coordination are effected through the SEC or the IAC Representatives to the National Estimates Board, and the resulting product reflects a community view on the subject, as exemplified by the production of NIE 11-6-54.		

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The Committee believes that this existing organization is adequate and that no additional guiding or coordinating mechanism is required.

In the production of national estimates and studies, guidance and coordination are effected through the SEC, EIC, JAEIC. The IAC and other agency representatives to the Board of National Estimates can also act to influence the product. It is believed that a single, qualified community group could handle the initial production aspects with greater ease and be in a better position to more expertly advise the Board in the final discussion of the national estimate.

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

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CIA, Chairman

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(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA) (Agreed)

This TAB is considered unnecessary in view of our conclusion that the present organizational structure is adequate to coordinate the community guided missile effort.

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TAB A

(State, AEC, CIA)

(IAC-D-81/9)
31 May 1955
Amended 4 November 1955

D R A F T

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/6

Establishment of Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

1. Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1 and 3 and for the purpose of strenghtening the over-all governmental intelligence structure and to improve intelligence in a field critical to the national security, a permanent Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) is hereby established under the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The Committee shall be composed of one member and alternates from the CIA; The Department of State; the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; The Joint Staff; The Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the National Security Agency.1/ Additionally, the Committee should include such ad hoc representation as may be required. The Chairman and Secretariat will be provided by CIA.

2. The mission of the Committee will be to improve guided missile intelligence. To this end, the responsibilities of the GMIC will include the following:

a. Providing recommendations for the over-all coordinated guidance and support to the

1/Subject to NSA acceptance of an IAC invitation.

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guided missile intelligence effort and to exercise such guidance as is authorized by the IAC;

b. Recommending new techniques for the collection and analysis of guided missile intelligence;

c. Providing continuing, coordinated requirements to the collectors;

d. Recommending the means to be established for making available to the participating agencies all guided missile intelligence information;

e. Planning and coordinating intelligence research according to the community's capabilities and needs;

f. Review and coordination of intelligence on guided missiles produced to serve as contributions to national intelligence estimates and national intelligence surveys;

g. Production of coordinated intelligence studies on guided missiles to be published under GMIC rubric;

h. Providing staff support when required by the IAC with respect to international conferences and planning in guided missile intelligence.

3. The GMIC, JAEIC, the SEC, the EIC, and the IPC* shall mutually assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective missions.

*Underscored portion represents the only change in the document.

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(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA) (Agreed) (State, AEC, CIA)

4. The GMIC will establish its method of procedure.

5. The GMIC shall report to the IAC periodically on progress in its field. Any problems that cannot be resolved by the GMIC shall be reported to the IAC immediately.

6. This directive supersedes DCID 3/4 insofar as guided missile intelligence aspects are concerned.

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